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We analyse the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in
the context of social welfare orderings. We study an axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of
society, the Weak Harm Principle, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill. We show that
liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for welfare
judgements. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some
fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, a strong relation is
established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian
principles in the Rawlsian tradition.
What are the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive
justice? Can liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom provide consistent
foundations for social welfare judgements? In particular, can a liberal non-interfering
approach help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to
intergenerational justice? What is the relation between classical liberal political
philosophy and the egalitarian tradition stemming from John Rawls’s seminal book
A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971)? This article addresses these questions and, in so doing,
it contributes to three different strands of the literature.
In recent work, Mariotti and Veneziani (2013, 2014) have explored a new notion of
respect for individual autonomy in social judgements, suited for social welfare
orderings (henceforth, SWOs)1 whose philosophical roots can be traced back to John
Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty, and his view of a sphere of individual freedom:
there is a sphere of action inwhich society . . .has, if any, only an indirect interest;
comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only
himself. . . This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty [italics added].
(Mill, 2003 [1859], p. 82)
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The principle of non-interference (or non-interference, in short) embodies the idea
that ‘an individual has the right to prevent society from acting against him in all
circumstances of change in his welfare, provided that the welfare of no other individual
is affected’ (Mariotti and Veneziani, 2013, p. 1690).
Formally, non-interference can be illustrated as follows: in a society with two
individuals, consider two allocations, or profiles, u ¼ ðu1;u2Þ and v ¼ ðv1; v2Þ,
describing the welfare levels of the two agents in two alternative scenarios. Suppose
that, for whatever reason, u is strictly socially preferred to v. Suppose then that agent
1 either suffers a welfare loss, or enjoys a welfare increase in both profiles, while agent
2’s welfare is unchanged, giving rise to two new profiles u0 ¼ ðu01;u2Þ and
v0 ¼ ðv01; v2Þ, with either u01 [ u1 and v01 [ v1; or u01\ u1 and v01\ v1. non-
interference says that, if agent 1’s welfare is strictly higher at u0 than at v0, then
society should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference
for v0 over u0. An agent ‘can veto society from a strict preference switch after a positive
or negative change that affects only [her] and nobody else’ (Mariotti and Veneziani,
2013, p. 1690).
The veto power accorded to individuals is weak because a switch to indifference is
admitted and because non-interference is silent in a number of cases (e.g. if agent 1’s
welfare changes in opposite directions, with ðu01  u1Þðv01  v1Þ\ 0, or if her welfare is
higher at v0 than at u0). There are numerous non-dictatorial, and even anonymous SWOs
that satisfy non-interference. Yet, Mariotti and Veneziani (2013) have proved that, in
societies with a finite number of agents, dictatorial SWOs are the only ones compatible
with non-interference among those satisfying weak Pareto.2 Lombardi and Veneziani
(2012) and Alcantud (2013b) have extended this result to societies with a countably
infinite number of agents.
This impossibility proves the limitations of liberal approaches to Paretian social
judgements: there cannot be any ‘protected sphere’ for individuals even if nobody else
is affected. As Mariotti and Veneziani (2013, p.1691) put it, ‘Of the appeals of the
individuals to be left alone because “nobody but me has been affected”, at least some
will necessarily have to be overruled’. The first contribution of this article to the
literature on liberal approaches is to analyse a specific, ethically relevant weakening of
non-interference and provide a series of positive results, both in the finite and in the
infinite context.
To be precise, we limit the bite of non-interference by giving individuals a veto power
only in situations in which they suffer a decrease in welfare. Arguably, this captures the
most intuitive aspect of a liberal ethics of non-interference, as it protects individuals
in situations where they suffer a damage, while nobody else is affected: a switch in
society’s strict preferences against an individual after she has incurred a welfare loss
would represent a punishment for her.
Formally, in the two-agent example above, we restrict non-interference to hold
in situations where u01\u1 and v
0
1\ v1. We call this axiom the Weak Harm Principle –
for it represents a strict weakening of the Harm Principle first introduced by Mariotti
2 The anonymity and weak Pareto axioms are formally defined in Section 1 below.
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and Veneziani (2009) – and show that a limited liberal ethics of non-interference can
lead to consistent social judgements.3
The implications of liberal principles of non-interference (in conjunction with
standard axioms in social choice), however, turn out to be fairly surprising. For there is
a strong formal and conceptual relation between liberal views, as incorporated in the
Weak Harm Principle, and egalitarian social welfare relations (henceforth, SWRs). The
analysis of this relation is the second main contribution of the article.
Formally, we provide a number of fresh characterisations of widely used Rawlsian
SWRs. Standard characterisations of the difference principle, or of its lexicographic
extension, are based either on informational invariance and separability properties
(d’Aspremont, 1985; d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002) or on axioms with a marked
egalitarian content such as the classic Hammond equity axiom (Hammond, 1976
1979).4
We prove that both the Rawlsian difference principle and its lexicographic extension
can be characterised by the Weak Harm Principle, together with standard efficiency,
fairness and – where appropriate – continuity properties. The adoption of SWRs with a
strong egalitarian bias can thus be justified by a liberal principle of non-interference
which is logically distinct from informational invariance and separability axioms,
but has no egalitarian content. Indeed the Weak Harm Principle has a marked
individualistic flavour (in the sense of Hammond, 1996).
This relation between liberal approaches and egalitarian SWRs has been originally
established by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009), who have characterised the leximin SWO
in finite societies based on the Harm Principle. We extend and generalise their insight
in various directions.
First of all, as noted above, we focus on a strict weakening of the Harm Principle.
This is important both formally and conceptually. Formally, it has been argued that the
characterisation in Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) is less surprising than it seems,
because under anonymity, the Harm Principle implies Hammond equity (Alcantud,
2013b, Proposition 4). This conclusion does not hold with the Weak Harm Principle:
even under anonymity, the Weak Harm Principle and Hammond equity are logically
independent and the original insight of Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) is therefore
strengthened. Conceptually, by ruling out only a strict preference switch in social
judgements, the Weak Harm Principle captures liberal and libertarian views more
clearly than the Harm Principle, for it emphasises the negative prescription at the core
of Mill’s analysis of non-interference and assigns a significantly weaker veto power to
individuals.
Further, based on the Weak Harm Principle, we also provide new characterisations
of Rawls’s difference principle. Compared to the leximin, the maximin SWR may be
deemed undesirable because it defines rather large indifference classes. Yet, in a
number of settings, its relatively simpler structure is a significant advantage, which
3 Mariotti and Veneziani (2012a) analyse different restrictions of non-interference and characterise Nash-
type orderings. For a related analysis of utilitarianism, see Mariotti and Veneziani (2012b).
4 See also Tungodden (1999, 2000) and Bosmans and Ooghe (2013). Similar axioms are used also in the
infinite context; see, for example, Lauwers (1997); Asheim and Tungodden (2004); Asheim et al. (2007);
Bossert et al. (2007); Alcantud (2013a); Asheim and Zuber (2013).
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allows one to capture the core egalitarian intuitions in a technically parsimonious way.
Moreover, unlike the leximin, the maximin satisfies continuity and therefore
egalitarian judgements based on the difference principle are more robust to small
measurement mistakes, e.g. in empirical analysis. This probably explains the wide use
of the maximin in modern theories of equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998, 2002;
Gotoh and Yoshihara, 2003), in experimental approaches to distributive justice
(Konow, 2002; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006), in the analysis of the ethics of exhaustible
resources and global warming (Solow, 1974; Cairns and Long, 2006; Llavador et al.,
2011; Roemer, 2011) and, in the context of intergenerational justice, (Silvestre, 2002;
Llavador et al., 2010).5 In the analysis of intergenerational justice and environmental
economics, the maximin principle is often taken to embody the very notion of
sustainability (Llavador et al., 2015).
Indeed, and this is the third main contribution of the article, we analyse liberal and
libertarian approaches to intergenerational justice. On the one hand, the intergen-
erational context provides a natural framework for the application of liberal principles
of non-interference. For there certainly are many economic decisions whose effects do
not extend over time and leave the welfare of other generations unchanged. Moreover,
liberal principles of non-interference capture some widespread ethical intuitions in
intergenerational justice (Wolf, 1995). In the seminal Brundtland (1987, p. 43) report,
for example, sustainable development is defined precisely as ‘development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their needs’.
On the other hand, the application of liberal principles to intergenerational justice
raises complex theoretical and technical issues. Lombardi and Veneziani (2012) and
Alcantud (2013b) have shown that there exists no fair and Paretian SWR that satisfies a
fully non-interfering view in societies with a countably infinite number of agents. More
generally, the analysis of distributive justice among an infinite number of generations
is problematic for all of the main approaches, and impossibility results often emerge
(Lauwers, 1997; Basu and Mitra, 2003; Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003; Zame, 2007; Hara
et al., 2008; Crespo et al., 2009). Several recent contributions have provided charac-
terisation results by dropping either completeness (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004;
Asheim et al., 2007; Basu and Mitra, 2007; Bossert et al., 2007) or transitivity (Sakai,
2010).6 But the definition of suitable anonymous and Paretian criteria is still an open
question in the infinite context (for a thorough discussion, see Asheim, 2010).
Our main contribution to this literature is a novel analysis of liberal egalitarianism in
economies with a countably infinite number of agents. To be specific, we provide a new
characterisation of one of the main extensions of the leximin criterion in infinitely-
lived societies, namely the leximin overtaking proposed by Asheim and Tungodden
(2004). As in the finite-horizon case, we show that the Weak Harm Principle can be
used to provide a simple and intuitive characterisation, without appealing to any
5 Maximin preferences are prominent also outside normative economics – for example, in decision theory
and experimental economics. See, inter alia, the classic papers by Maskin (1979); Barbera and Jackson (1988);
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); and, more recently, Sarin and Vahid (2001); de Castro et al. (2011).
6 Asheim and Zuber (2013) have recently proposed a complete and transitive extension of the leximin
which overcomes the impossibility by requiring only sensitivity to the interests of generations whose
consumption has finite rank.
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informational invariance or separability property or to axioms with an egalitarian
content. Indeed, although we focus on a specific extension of the leximin that is
prominent in the literature on evaluating infinite utility streams, our arguments can be
modified to obtain new characterisations for all of the main approaches.
We also extend the analysis of Rawls’s difference principle to the intergenerational
context. As already noted, if the leximin is adopted, social judgements are sensitive to
tiny changes in welfare profiles and measurement errors. In the intergenerational
context, an additional issue concerns the significant incompleteness of leximin SWRs
which may hamper social evaluation in a number of ethically relevant scenarios (see
the discussion in Asheim et al., 2010). Therefore we provide a novel characterisation of
the maximin SWO (more precisely, the infimum rule, Lauwers, 1997) in societies with a
countably infinite number of agents: based on the Weak Harm Principle, we identify a
complete egalitarian criterion that allows for robust social evaluation of intergener-
ational distributive conflicts.
Our result differs from other characterisations in the literature in two key respects.
Conceptually, the characterisation is again obtained by focusing on standard efficiency,
fairness and continuity properties together with a liberal principle of non-interference:
neither egalitarian axioms, nor informational invariance or separability properties
are necessary. Formally, unlike in Lauwers’s (1997) seminal paper, the proof of the
characterisation result in the infinite context echoes very closely that in finite societies:
both the axiomatic framework and the method of proof – and thus the underlying
ethical intuitions – are essentially invariant.
In the light of our results, we can provide some tentative answers to the questions
posed in the opening paragraph. Liberal and libertarian approaches emphasising
individual autonomy and freedom are logically consistent and provide useful guidance
in social judgements (including in the analysis of intergenerational justice), provided
the notion of non-interference is suitably restricted. Perhaps counterintuitively,
however, a liberal non-interfering approach emphasising individual protection in
circumstances of welfare losses leads straight to welfare egalitarianism. Based on the
Weak Harm Principle, it is possible to provide a unified axiomatic framework to analyse
a set of SWRs originating from Rawls’s difference principle in a welfaristic framework.
Thus, our analysis sheds new light on the normative foundations of standard
egalitarian principles and provides a rigorous justification for the label ‘liberal
egalitarianism’ usually associated with Rawls’s approach.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic framework.
Section 2 introduces our main liberal axiom and characterises the leximin SWO in
economies with a finite number of agents. Section 3 analyses the implications of liberal
views for robust (continuous) SWOs and derives a characterisation of the difference
principle. Sections 4 and 5 extend the analysis to the intergenerational context.
Section 6 concludes.
1. The Framework
Let N denote the (non-empty) set of individuals in society and let T be the cardinality
of N . In this article, we analyse societies with both a finite and an infinite number of
agents. In the former case, T is a natural number T and the set of agents is denoted by
© 2015 The Authors.
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N. In the latter case, T ¼ 1 and the set of agents corresponds to the set of strictly
positive natural numbers N. In the rest of this Section, we provide the basic definitions
and axioms that are common to both the finite and the infinite case.
Each agent i in N can reach a certain level of welfare, which is normalised so that
the set of all welfare levels that agent i can achieve is the closed interval X  [0,1]. A
list of welfare levels achieved by each agent, a welfare profile, is a point in X T  ½0; 1T ,
where for any profile u 2 X T, and for every agent i in N, ui denotes i’s welfare at u.
Thus, for example, X1 denotes the set of countably infinite welfare profiles for agents
in N.7
We are interested in the social judgements over alternative allocations of welfare
among individuals in society. Let < be a (binary) relation on X T. For any u; v 2 X T,
u< v stands for ðu; vÞ 2 < and u 6< v for ðu; vÞ 62 <; < stands for ‘at least as good as’.
The asymmetric part  of < is defined by u v if and only if u< v and v 6< u, and the
symmetric part  of < is defined by u v if and only if u< v and v< u. They stand
respectively for ‘strictly better than’ and ‘indifferent to’. A relation < is said to be:
reflexive if, for any u 2 X T , u < u; and transitive if, for any u; v;w 2 X T , u< v<w
implies u<w. A relation < on X T is a SWR if it is reflexive and transitive.
In this article, we study some desirable properties of SWRs, which incorporate notions
of efficiency, fairness and liberal views of non-interference. In this Section, we present
some basic axioms that are used in the rest of the article.
A property of SWRs that is a priori desirable is that they be able to rank all possible
alternatives. Formally:8
COMPLETENESS. For all u; v 2 X T , if u 6¼ v, then u< v or v<u.
A relation < on X T is a SWO if it is a complete SWR.
For any x 2 X, let conx ¼ ðx; x; . . .Þ denote the profile in which all agents reach the
same level of welfare equal to x. The standard way of capturing efficiency properties is
by means of the Pareto axioms.9
STRONG PARETO. For all u; v 2 X T , if u > v, then u v.
WEAK PARETO. For all u; v 2 X T , and all  2 X with  > 0, if u  v þ con, then u v.
Strong Pareto states that if all agents are at least as well off in u as in v, and some of
them are strictly better off, then u should be socially strictly preferred to v. Weak Pareto
is weaker in that it requires all agents to be (discernibly) strictly better off in u as in v.
7 The focus on the space of bounded profiles is standard in the literature (Lauwers, 1997; Basu and Mitra,
2003, 2007; Zame, 2007; Hara et al., 2008; Asheim, 2010; Asheim and Banerjee, 2010). It is worth noting in
passing that, from a theoretical viewpoint, the T -dimensional unit box can be interpreted as the set of all
conceivable distributions of opportunities, where the latter are conceived of as chances in life, or
probabilities of success as in Mariotti and Veneziani (2012a, b).
8 Note that if u = v , then u< v is guaranteed by reflexivity.
9 The notation for vector inequalities is as follows: for any u; v 2 X T , u ≥ v if and only if ui  vi , for each
i 2 N ; u > v if and only if u ≥ v and u 6¼ v; and u ≫ v if and only if ui [ vi , for each i 2 N .
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Observe that if T ¼ T , then weak Pareto is equivalent to the standard weak Pareto
axiom.
A basic requirement of fairness is embodied in the next axiom, which states that
social judgements ought to be neutral with respect to agents’ identities (Basu and
Mitra, 2003).
ANONYMITY. For all u; v 2 X T , if there exist two agents i; j 2 N such that ui ¼ vj and
uj ¼ vi, and, for all other agents k 2 Nnfi; jg, uk ¼ vk, then u v.
Because every permutation of a finite number of elements in a set is the composition
of a finite number of permutations of two elements in that set, by transitivity,
anonymity implies that for every SWR, any two profiles u, v that are identical up to a
finite permutation of their elements must be indifferent.
2. The Weak Harm Principle
We study the implications of liberal views of non-interference in fair and Paretian social
welfare judgements. In this Section, we define and discuss the main liberal principle
and then present a novel characterisation of the leximin SWO in the finite context.
The key features of liberal views in social choice are captured by the Weak Harm
Principle, according to which agents have a right to prevent society from turning
against them in all situations in which they suffer a welfare loss, provided no other
agent is affected. Formally:
WEAK HARM PRINCIPLE. For all u; v 2 XT , if u v and if u0; v0 2 XT are such that
u0i\ui ; v
0
i\vi ; for some agent i 2 N and
u0j ¼ uj ; v0j ¼ vj ; for each agent j 6¼ i,
then v0¤ u0 if u0i [ v
0
i .
In other words, consider two profiles u and v such that, for whatever reason, u is strictly
socially preferred to v. Then suppose that agent i suffers a welfare loss in both profiles,
while all other agents’ welfare is unchanged, giving rise to two new profiles u0 and v0.
The Weak Harm Principle says that, if agent i strictly prefers u0 to v0 (his welfare is
higher at u0 than at v0) then society should not reverse the strict preference between u
and v to a strict preference for v0 over u0.
The Weak Harm Principle captures a liberal view of non-interference whenever
individual choices have no effect on others. The decrease in agent i’s welfare may be
due to negligence or bad luck, but in any case the principle states that society should
not strictly prefer v0 over u0: having already suffered a welfare loss in both profiles, an
adverse switch in society’s strict preferences against agent i would represent an
unjustified punishment for him.
The Weak Harm Principle assigns a veto power to individuals in situations in which
they suffer harm and no other agent is affected. This veto power is weak in that it only
applies to certain welfare configurations (individual preferences after the welfare loss
© 2015 The Authors.
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must coincide with society’s initial preferences) and, crucially, the individual cannot
force society’s preferences to coincide with his own.
It is important to stress that the principle incorporates some key liberal intuitions, and
so it may conflict with different views on distributive justice. For there may be many
non-liberal reasons for society to switch from u  v to v0  u0. For example, it may be the
case that the sum (the product) of individual utilities is higher at u than at v but the
opposite is true when the primed alternatives are considered, then, in a classical
utilitarian (Nash/prioritarian) approach, one would have u  v, but v0  u0.
In this case, the Weak Harm Principle may seem objectionable as it requires ignoring
all information concerning the size of the changes in welfare. The key point here is
that the axiom is not meant to capture utilitarian, Nash/prioritarian, or indeed any
other distributive intuitions: it aims to incorporate some liberal views of autonomy and
protection from interference, for which issues of interpersonal comparability of welfare
changes are at best irrelevant. The axiom has an individualistic and non-aggregative
structure (focusing on changes in the situation of a single agent when everyone else is
indifferent) precisely in order to capture this important intuition of liberal and
libertarian approaches.
The Weak Harm Principle is weaker than the Principle of Non-Interference
formulated by Mariotti and Veneziani (2013) since it only focuses on welfare losses
incurred by agents. It also represents a strict weakening of the Harm Principle
proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) because, unlike the latter, it does not
require that society’s preferences over u0 and v0 be identical with agent i’s, but only that
society should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference
for v0 over u0 (possibly except when i’s welfare is higher at v0). This weakening is
important for both conceptual and formal reasons.
Conceptually, the Weak Harm Principle aims to capture – in a welfaristic framework
– a negative freedom that is central in classical liberal and libertarian approaches,
namely, freedom from interference from society, when no other individual is affected.
The name of the axiom itself is meant to echo John Stuart Mill’s famous formulation in
his essay On Liberty:10
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others,
society has a jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare
will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.
But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself [italics added].
(Mill, 2003 [1859], p. 139)
In this sense, by only requiring that agent i should not be punished in the SWR by
changing social preferences against her, the liberal content of the axiom is much
clearer and the Weak Harm Principle strongly emphasises the negative prescription of
Mill’s principle.
Formally, our weakening of the Harm Principle has relevant implications. Mariotti
and Veneziani (2009, Theorem 1, p. 126) prove that, jointly with strong Pareto,
10 For a comprehensive philosophical discussion, see Mariotti and Veneziani (2014).
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anonymity, and completeness, the Harm Principle characterises the leximin SWO,
according to which that society is best which lexicographically maximises the welfare of
its worst-off members. For any profile u 2 XT , let u ¼ ðu1; . . . ; uT Þ be a permutation
of u such that the components are ranked in ascending order with u1  u2  . . .  uT .
DEFINITION 1. The leximin SWO < LMT on XT is defined as follows. For all u; v 2 XT ,
(i) u LMT v , ui ¼ vi for all i 2 N;
(ii) u LMT v , there is some i 2 N such that ui [ vi and uj ¼ vj for each j < i.
The leximin SWO is usually considered to have a strong egalitarian bias and so a
characterisation based on a liberal principle with no explicit egalitarian content is
surprising. To clarify this point, note that the classic characterisation by Hammond
(1976) states that a SWR is the leximin SWO if and only if it satisfies strong Pareto,
anonymity, completeness and the following axiom:
HAMMOND EQUITY. For all u; v 2 XT , if ui\ vi\ vj\ uj for two agents i,j 2 N, and
uk ¼ vk for all other agents k 2 N n{i,j}, then v< u.
Unlike the Harm Principle, Hammond equity expresses a clear concern for equality,
for it asserts that among two welfare profiles which are not Pareto-ranked and differ
only in two components, society should prefer the more egalitarian one.
Hammond equity and the Harm Principle are conceptually distinct and logically
independent. Yet, it has been argued that the characterisation of the leximin SWO in
Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) is formally not surprising because, under anonymity and
completeness, the Harm Principle implies Hammond equity (Alcantud, 2013b,
Proposition 4).11 This objection does not hold if one considers the Weak Harm
Principle. To see this, consider the following example.
EXAMPLE 1 (Sufficientarianism). Suppose that welfare units can be normalised so that a
welfare level equal to 1/2 represents a decent living standard. Then one can define a SWR <s on
XT according to which that society is best in which the highest number of people reach a decent
living standard. Formally, for all u 2 XT , let PðuÞ ¼ fi 2 N : ui  1=2g and let |P(u)| denote
the cardinality of P(u). Then, for all u; v 2 XT :
u <sv , jPðuÞj  jPðvÞj:
It is immediate to see that <s is a SWO and it satisfies anonymity and the Weak Harm Principle,
but violates both Hammond equity and the Harm Principle.12
The absence of any conceptual and formal relations between the Weak Harm
Principle and Hammond equity, even under anonymity, established in Example 1 is
not a mere technical artefact. The Suppes-Sen grading principle, for instance, satisfies
anonymity and the Weak Harm Principle and violates Hammond equity but one may
11 The argument is originally due to Francois Maniquet in unpublished correspondence.
12 Consider, for example, the profiles u = (1,0) and v = (1/3, 1/4). By definition u s v, which violates
Hammond equity. Therefore, since <s is anonymous and complete, it also violates the Harm Principle.
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object that this is due to its incompleteness. In contrast, the SWR in Example 1 is
complete and it embodies a prominent approach to distributive justice in political
philosophy and social choice (Frankfurt, 1987; Roemer, 2004). Thus, even under
anonymity and completeness, liberal principles of non-interference incorporate
substantially different normative intuitions than standard equity axioms. Example 1
also highlights the theoretical relevance of our weakening of the Harm Principle, for
the Weak Harm Principle is consistent with a wider class of SWOs, including some – such
as the sufficientarian – which embody widely shared views on distributive justice.
Given this, it is remarkable that the characterisation result provided in Mariotti and
Veneziani (2009) can be strengthened.13
PROPOSITION 1. A SWR < on XT is the leximin SWO <LMT if and only if it satisfies
anonymity, strong Pareto, completeness and the Weak Harm Principle.
In the light of our discussion of the Weak Harm Principle and Example 1, it is worth
stressing some key theoretical implications of Proposition 1. First, it is possible to
eschew impossibility results by weakening the Principle of Non-Interference proposed
by Mariotti and Veneziani (2014) while capturing some core liberal intuitions. For by
Proposition 1 there exist anonymous and strongly Paretian SWOs consistent with liberal
non-interfering views, as expressed in the Weak Harm Principle.
Second, by Proposition 1 Hammond equity and the Weak Harm Principle are
equivalent in the presence of anonymity, completeness, and strong Pareto, even
though they are logically independent. However, it can be proved that if T = 2, then
under strong Pareto and completeness, Hammond equity implies the Weak Harm
Principle, but the converse is never true (Mariotti and Veneziani, 2014). Together with
Example 1, this implies that Proposition 1 is far from trivial. For even under
completeness and either anonymity or strong Pareto, the Weak Harm Principle is not
stronger than Hammond equity and it is actually strictly weaker, at least in some cases.
Third, Proposition 1 puts the normative foundations of leximin in a rather different
light. For, unlike in standard results, the egalitarian SWO is characterised without
appealing to any axioms with a clear egalitarian content.14 Actually, strong Pareto,
completeness and the Weak Harm Principle are compatible with some of the least
egalitarian SWOs, namely the lexicographic dictatorships, which proves that the Weak
Harm Principle imposes no significant egalitarian restriction. As a result, Proposition 1
highlights the normative strength of Anonymity in determining the egalitarian
outcome, an important insight which is not obvious in standard characterisations based
on Hammond equity.15
13 The properties in Proposition 1 are clearly independent. The proof of Proposition 1 is a generalisation
of the proof of Theorem 1 in Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) and is available from the authors upon request.
14 Nor to any invariance or separability axioms.
15 To be sure, from a purely formal viewpoint, it is the interaction of the four axioms which drives the
egalitarian outcome in Proposition 1. As the discussion of Example 1 above shows, the removal of either
strong Pareto or completeness allows for SWRs that are not necessarily egalitarian. Similarly, several non-
egalitarian or even inegalitarian SWRs are compatible with completeness, anonymity and strong Pareto, such
as the utilitarian or the leximax SWOs. Conceptually, however, in our framework, anonymity is the axiom
which most clearly embodies a notion of justice as fairness.
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In order to illustrate the role of the different axioms in ruling out inegalitarian SWRs,
and the basic intuition behind the proof of Proposition 1, consider a society with only
two agents. For any x 2 X, a minimal egalitarian principle requires that
ðx  ; x þ Þ¤ ðx; xÞ for any positive real number  such that ðx  ; x þ Þ 2 X 2.
For the sake of concreteness and without loss of generality, consider x = 1/2 and
 = 1/4. We show that for any SWR that satisfies our four axioms, indeed (1/4, 3/4)
cannot be strictly preferred to (1/2, 1/2). Suppose, to the contrary, that (1/4, 3/4)
(1/2, 1/2). Then by the Weak Harm Principle, together with completeness,
ð1=4; u2Þ< ð1=2; 1=4Þ for any 1=4\u2\ 3=4. But then we can use strong Pareto,
together with transitivity, to break the indifferences and obtain (1/4, 1/2) (1/2,
1/4), which yields a contradiction by anonymity. The next Sections significantly extend
and generalise these intuitions
3. Liberal Egalitarianism Reconsidered
One common objection to the leximin SWO is its sensitivity to small changes in
welfare profiles, and so to measurement errors and minor variations in policies.
Albeit possibly secondary in theoretical analyses, these issues are relevant in
empirical applications and policy debates. As Chichilnisky (1982, p. 346) aptly
noted,
Continuity is a natural assumption that is made throughout the body of
economic theory, and it is certainly desirable as it permits approximation of
social preferences on the basis of a sample of individual preferences, and
makes mistakes in identifying preferences less crucial. These are relevant
considerations in a world of imperfect information.
In this Section, we study the implications of liberal non-interfering approaches for
social evaluations that are robust to small changes in welfare profiles. A standard way of
capturing this property is by an interprofile condition requiring the SWR to vary
continuously with changes in welfare profiles.
CONTINUITY. For all u 2 XT , fv 2 XT jv< ug and fv 2 XT ju < vg are closed sets.
By Proposition 1, if continuity is imposed in addition to the Weak Harm Principle,
completeness, strong Pareto and anonymity, an impossibility result immediately
obtains. Indeed, it is possible to show that a conflict exists even if anonymity is
dropped. To see this, consider the following example.
EXAMPLE 2 (Impossibility). Consider a society with only two agents, without loss of generality.
Suppose that a SWR < on X 2 satisfies the Weak Harm Principle, completeness, strong Pareto and
continuity. By strong Pareto, (1, 1/2)  (3/4, 1/2). By continuity and completeness, there
exists a sufficiently small real number [ 0 such that (1, 1/2)(3/4, (1/2) + ). For all
natural numbers k > 0, let the sequence ðuk1Þk2N be defined by uk1 ¼ 1=2 þ 1=2kþ 1. Because the
sequence lies entirely in the open interval (1/2, 1), by the Weak Harm Principle and
completeness, ðuk1; 1=2Þ< ð1=2; ð1=2Þ þ Þ for all k. Therefore since the sequence converges
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monotonically to 1/2, continuity implies that ð1=2; 1=2Þ< ð1=2; ð1=2Þ þ Þ, in violation of
strong Pareto.
Therefore, given our interest in liberal principles of non-interference, we weaken
our efficiency requirement to focus on weak Pareto and show that the combination of
the five axioms characterises Rawls’s difference principle, according to which that
society is best which maximises the welfare of the worst off individual.16
DEFINITION 2. The maximin SWO <M on X T is defined as follows. For all u; v 2 X T ,
u <Mv , inf
i2N
ui  inf
i2N
vi :
Theorem 1 states that the standard requirements of fairness, efficiency, complete-
ness and continuity, together with our liberal axiom characterise the maximin SWO.17
THEOREM 1. A SWR < on XT is the maximin SWO <M if and only if it satisfies anonymity,
weak Pareto, completeness, continuity and the Weak Harm Principle.
Proof. Since the proof of the (⇒) part of the statement can be easily verified, we
shall only prove its (⇐) part.
(⇐) Let < on XT be a SWR satisfying the specified set of axioms. We show that < is
the maximin SWO. We prove that, for all u; v 2 XT ,
u M v , u  v (1)
and
uMv , u v: (2)
Note that as < is transitive and satisfies anonymity, in what follows we can focus
either on u and v, or on the corresponding ranked profiles u and v, without loss of
generality. Further, by construction, inf i2N ui ¼ u1 and inf i2N vi ¼ v1.
First, we show that the implication (⇒) of (1) is satisfied. Take any u; v 2 XT .
Suppose that u M v , u1 [ v1. We proceed by contradiction, first proving that v u
is impossible and then ruling out v u.
Suppose that v u, or equivalently, v  u. As weak Pareto holds, vj  uj for some
j 2 N, otherwise a contradiction immediately obtains. We proceed according to the
following steps.
Step 1. Let
k ¼ inffl 2 N jvl  ulg:
By anonymity and the transitivity of <, let vi ¼ vk and let ui ¼ u1. Then, consider two
real numbers d1, d2 [ 0, and two profiles u	, v0 – together with the corresponding
ranked profiles u	, v0 – formed from u, v as follows: u1 is lowered to u1  d1 [ v1; vk is
16 Note that Definition 2 holds both in the finite and in the infinite context.
17 The properties in Theorem 1 are independent (details are available from the authors upon request).
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lowered to uk [ vk  d2 [ u1  d1; and all other entries of u and v are unchanged.
By construction u	; v0 2 XT and u	j [ v0j for all j ≤ k, whereas by the Weak Harm
Principle, completeness, anonymity and transitivity we have v0< u	.
Step 2. Let  be a real number such that
0\\ inffu	j  v0j jj  kg
and define u0 ¼ u	  con . By construction, u0 2 XT and u	 
 u0. Weak Pareto implies
u	  u0. As v0< u	, by step 1, the transitivity of < implies v0  u0.
If u0j [ v
0
j for all j 2 N, weak Pareto implies u0  v0, a contradiction. Otherwise, let
v0l  u0l for some l > k. Then, let
k0 ¼ inffl 2 N jv0l  u0lg:
The above steps 1 and 2 can be applied to u0, v0 to derive profiles u00, v00 2 XT such
that u00j [ v
00
j for all j  k0, whereas v00  u00. By weak Pareto, a contradiction is obtained
whenever u00j [ v
00
j for all j 2 N. Otherwise, let v00l  u00l for some l [ k0. And so on.
After a finite number s of iterations, two profiles us; vs 2 XT can be derived such that
vs  us , by steps 1 and 2, but us  vs , by weak Pareto, a contradiction.
Therefore, by completeness, it must be u< v whenever u M v. We have to rule out
the possibility that u v. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that u v. Since
v1\ u1, there exists  2 X with  > 0 such that u ¼ u  con , u 2 XT , and v1\ u1 so
that u M v. However, by weak Pareto and the transitivity of < it follows that v  u.
Apply the above reasoning to v and u to obtain the desired contradiction.
Now, we show that the implication (⇒) of (2) is met as well. Suppose u1 ¼ v1. If
u1 ¼ 1, the result follows by reflexivity. Hence suppose u1\ 1. Let
N ðuÞ ¼ fi 2 N : ui ¼ u1g and let uK be such that uKi ¼ ui , all i 62 N(u), and
uKi ¼ ui þ K1, all i 2 N(u), where K is any natural number such that ui þ K1\ 1,
all i 2 N(u). By construction, uK 2 XT and uk1 [ v1 for all k ≥ K. Since limk!1 uk ¼ u
and uk 2 fw 2 XT jw< vg for all k ≥ K, continuity implies u<v. A symmetric argument
proves that v< u, and so u v. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 has two main implications in the context of our analysis. First, it shows
that anonymous and (weakly) Paretian liberal SWOs exist that are also continuous. This
is particularly interesting given that the consistency between weak Pareto, continuity
properties, and liberal principles in the spirit of Sen’s celebrated minimal liberalism
axiom has been recently called into question by Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
Second, Theorem 1 provides a novel characterisation of the difference principle that
generalises the key insight of Section 2. Standard characterisations focus either on
informational invariance and separability properties (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002;
Segal and Sobel, 2002), or on axioms incorporating a clear inequality aversion such
as Hammond equity (Bosmans and Ooghe, 2013) or the Pigou-Dalton principle
(Fleurbaey and Tungodden, 2010). Theorem 1 characterises an egalitarian SWO by
using an axiom – the Weak Harm Principle – that, unlike informational invariance
properties, has a clear ethical foundation but it has no egalitarian content as it only
incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society.
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4. A Liberal Principle of Intergenerational Justice
In the previous Sections, we study the implications of liberal principles of non-
interference in societies with a finite number of agents. We now extend our analysis to
societies with a countably infinite number of agents, or generations. A liberal non-
interfering approach seems particularly appropriate in the analysis of intergenera-
tional distributive issues: although the welfare of a generation is often affected by
decisions taken by their predecessors, there certainly are many economic decisions
whose effects do not extend over time and leave the welfare of other generations
unchanged. In this Section (and the next), we explore the implications of fair and
Paretian liberal approaches to intergenerational justice.18
As a first step, we introduce some additional notation that is relevant only in
the infinite context. For any generation T and any welfare profile u 2 X1,
1uT ¼ ðu1; . . . ; uT Þ denotes the T-head of u and T þ 1u ¼ ðuT þ 1; uT þ 2; . . .Þ denotes
its T-tail, so that u is the combined profile ð1uT ; T þ 1uÞ. Further, let < and <0 be SWRs
defined on X1, we say that <0 is an extension of < if for any u; v 2 X1, u< v implies
u <0v, and u v implies u 0 v.
The extension of the main liberal principle to the analysis of intergenerational
justice is rather straightforward and needs no further comment, except possibly noting
that in this context, the Weak Harm Principle is weakened to hold only for pairs of
welfare profiles whose tails can be Pareto-ranked.
WEAK HARM PRINCIPLE	. For all u; v 2 X1 with v  ð1vT ; ðT þ 1u þ conÞÞ for some
generation T ≥ 1 and some  ≥ 0, if u v and if u0; v0 2 X1 are such that
u0i\ui ; v
0
i\ vi , for some generation iT , and
u0j ¼ uj ; v0j ¼ vj , for each generation j 6¼ i;
then v0¤u0 if u0i [ v
0
i .
As already noted, economies with an infinite number of agents raise several
formal and conceptual issues and different definitions of the main criteria
(including utilitarianism, egalitarianism, the Nash SWR, and so on) can be provided
in order to compare (countably) infinite welfare profiles. Here, we derive a novel
characterisation of one of the main approaches in the literature, namely the
leximin overtaking recently formalised by Asheim and Tungodden (2004), in the
tradition of Atsumi (1965) and von Weizs€acker (1965). Yet, as argued at the end of
the Section, our key results are robust and the Weak Harm Principle can be used to
provide normative foundations to all of the main extensions of the leximin SWR to
the infinite context.
18 As noted by an anonymous referee, from a formal viewpoint, our analysis applies to any societies with a
countably infinite number of agents and not exclusively to the intergenerational context. Yet, conceptually,
we believe that our framework is particularly suited to analyse intergenerational justice, especially given that
some of the axioms rely on a natural ordering of the agents.
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With the help of Definition 1, the leximin overtaking SWR can be defined as follows.
DEFINITION 3 (ASHEIM AND TUNGODDEN, 2004, DEFINITION 2, P. 224).The leximin
overtaking SWR <LM 	 on X1 is defined as follows. For all u; v 2 X1,
(i) u LM 	v ⇔ there is a generation ~T  1 such that 1uT  LMT 1vT for all T  ~T ;
(ii) u LM 	v ⇔ there is a generation ~T  1 such that 1uT LMT 1vT for all T  ~T .
According to Definition 3, an infinite welfare profile u is strictly preferred to another
profile v if and only if there is a finite period ~T such that, for every period T after ~T ,
the welfare levels of the first T generations at u strictly leximin dominate those of the first
T generations at v. Similarly,u is indifferent to v if and only if there is a period ~T such that,
for every period T after ~T , the T-head of u is leximin indifferent to the T-head of v.
In order to characterise the leximin overtaking SWR, we need to weaken completeness
and require that the SWR be (at least) able to compare profiles with the same tail.
MINIMAL COMPLETENESS. For all u; v 2 X1 with u ¼ ð1uT ; T þ 1vÞ for some generation
T ≥ 1, if u 6¼ v, then u< v or v<u.
Finally, in the analysis of intergenerational justice, we follow the literature and
consider a mainly technical requirement to deal with infinite-dimensional profiles
(Asheim and Tungodden, 2004; Basu and Mitra, 2007; Asheim, 2010; Asheim and
Banerjee, 2010).
WEAK PREFERENCE CONTINUITY. For all u; v 2 X1, if there is generation ~T  1 such that
ð1uT ; T þ 1vÞ  v for each successive generation T  ~T, then u v.
Axioms such as weak preference continuity (and the analogous preference
continuity analysed in Section 5 below) establish ‘a link to the standard finite setting
of distributive justice, by transforming the comparison of any two infinite utility paths
to an infinite number of comparisons of utility paths each containing a finite number
of generations’ (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004, p. 223).
Theorem 2 proves that anonymity, strong Pareto, the Weak Harm Principle	,
minimal completeness and weak preference continuity characterise the leximin
overtaking.19
THEOREM 2. A SWR < on X1 is an extension of the leximin overtaking SWR <LM 	 if and only
if < satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, minimal completeness, the Weak Harm Principle	 and
weak preference continuity.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that the SWR < on X1 is an extension of the leximin overtaking
SWR <LM 	 . It is easy to see that < meets anonymity and strong Pareto. By observing that
<LM 	 is complete for comparisons between profiles with the same tail it is also easy to
see that < satisfies minimal completeness and weak preference continuity.
19 The properties in Theorem 2 are independent (details are available from the authors upon request).
© 2015 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2016] L I B E R A L E G A L I T A R I A N I S M 2187
We show that < meets the Weak Harm Principle	. Take any profiles u; v;u0; v0 2 X1
satisfying its premises. We prove that u0  v0, whenever u0i [ v0i . Because <LM
	
is
complete for comparisons between profiles whose tails differ by a nonnegative
constant, u LM 	 v. Then take any generation T 0  maxfi; ~Tg where ~T corresponds to
part (ii) of Definition 3. If u0i [ v
0
i , then Theorem 1 in Mariotti and Veneziani (2009,
p. 126) implies that 1u0T 0 LMT 0 1v0T 0 . Because the choice of T 0  maxfi; ~Tg was arbitrary,
u0  v0, as sought.
(⇐) Suppose that the SWR < on X1 satisfies the above set of axioms. We show that
the SWR < is an extension of the leximin overtaking SWR <LM 	 . Take any u; v 2 X1.
That u LM 	v implies u v follows as in Asheim and Tungodden (2004), by
Anonymity and the transitivity of<. Therefore we only show that u LM 	 v implies u v.
Letu LM 	 v. Take anyT  ~T that corresponds topart (ii) ofDefinition3 and consider
the combined profile w  ð1uT ;T þ 1vÞ 2 X1. Note that w LM
	
v. We show that w v.
For any u 2 X1, and all T ≥ 1, let 1uT ¼ ðu1; . . .; uT Þ be a permutation of the
T-head of u such that the components are ranked in ascending order. By anonymity
and transitivity, we can focus on the combined profiles ~w  ð1uT ; T þ 1vÞ and
~v  ð1vT ; T þ 1vÞ. Note that since w LM
	
v, by Definition 3 there exists t 2 {1, 2, . . ., T}
such that ut [ vt and uj ¼ vj for each j < t.
By minimal completeness, suppose – by way of contradiction – that ~v< ~w. We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1. ~v  ~w.
As strong Pareto holds it must be the case that ~vl [ ~wl for some l, where t < l ≤ T.
Let:
k ¼ infft\l T j~vl [ ~wlg:
By anonymity, let vi ¼ ~vk and let wi ¼ ~wk g , for some 1 ≤ g < k, where ~wk g [ ~vk g .
Then, let two real numbers d1, d2 [ 0, and consider profilesw0; v0 2 X1 formed from ~w ,
~v as follows: ~wkg is lowered to ~wkg  d1 such that ~wkg  d1 [ ~vkg ; ~vk is lowered
to ~vk  d2 such that ~wk [ ~vk  d2 [ ~wkg  d1; and all other entries of ~w and ~v
are unchanged. By anonymity and transitivity, consider the combined profiles
~w0  ð1w0T , T þ 1vÞ and ~v0  ð1v0T , T þ 1vÞ. By construction ~w0j  ~v0j for all j ≤ k, with
~w0kg [ ~v
0
kg , whereas theWeakHarmPrinciple
	, combinedwithminimal completeness,
anonymity, and transitivity implies ~v0< ~w0. Furthermore, by strong Pareto, it is possible to
choose d1, d2 [ 0, such that ~v0  ~w0, without loss of generality. Consider two cases:
Case 1.
(a) suppose that ~vk [ ~wk , but ~wl  ~vl for all l > k. It follows that ~w0 [ ~v0, and so
strong Pareto implies that ~w0  ~v0, a contradiction and
(b) suppose that ~vl [ ~wl for some l , k < l ≤ T. Note that by construction ~v0l ¼ ~vl
and ~w0l ¼ ~wl for all l > k. Then, let:
k0 ¼ inffk\l T j~v0l [ ~w0lg:
The above argument can be applied to ~w0, ~v0 to derive combined profiles ~w00; ~v00 2 X1
such that ~w00j  ~v00j for all j  k0, with at least one strict inequality, whereas the Weak
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Harm Principle	, combined with minimal completeness, anonymity, strong Pareto,
and transitivity implies ~v00  ~w00. And so on. After a finite number of iterations s, two
combined profiles ~ws; ~vs 2 X1 can be derived such that, by the Weak Harm
Principle	, combined with minimal completeness, anonymity, strong Pareto, and
transitivity we have that ~vs  ~ws , but strong Pareto implies ~ws  ~vs , yielding a
contradiction.
Case 2. ~v ~w.
Since, by our supposition, ~vt\ ut  ~wt , there exists a real number  > 0 such that
~vt\ ~wt  \ ~wt . Let ~w 2 X1 be a profile such that ~wt ¼ ~wt   and ~wj ¼ ~wj for all
j 6¼ t. It follows that ~w LM 	 ~v but ~v  ~w by Strong Pareto and the transitivity of <.
Hence, the argument of Case 1 above can be applied to ~v and ~w, yielding the desired
contradiction.
Therefore minimal completeness implies ~w  ~v. Then anonymity, combined with
the transitivity of <, implies ð1uT ; T þ 1vÞ  v. Since the choice of T  ~T was arbitrary,
weak preference continuity implies uv, as desired. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 shows that, if the principle of non-interference analysed by Lombardi
and Veneziani (2012) and Alcantud (2013b) is suitably restricted to hold only for
welfare losses, then intergenerational distributive conflicts can be adjudicated by
means of liberal, fair and Paretian social criteria. Indeed, Theorem 2 provides a novel
characterisation of one of the main extensions of the leximin to economies with an
infinite number of agents, based on the Weak Harm Principle	, thus confirming the
link between a liberal and libertarian concern for individual autonomy, and egalitarian
criteria, in the intergenerational context also.20
These conclusions are robust and can be extended to alternative definitions of the
leximin.21 For example, if weak preference continuity is replaced with a stronger
continuity requirement, a stronger version of the leximin overtaking (the S-Leximin,
see Asheim and Tungodden, 2004, Definition 1, p. 224) can easily be derived.
Perhaps more interestingly, Bossert et al. (2007) have dropped continuity properties
and have characterised a larger class of extensions of the leximin criterion satisfying
strong Pareto, anonymity, and an infinite version of Hammond equity.22 Lombardi
and Veneziani (2009) have shown that it is possible to provide a characterisation of
the leximin relation defined by Bossert et al. (2007) based on strong Pareto,
anonymity and the Weak Harm Principle. Further, the Weak Harm Principle can be
20 It is worth noting in passing that Theorem 2 can be further strengthened by requiring the Weak Harm
Principle	 to hold only for profiles with the same tail, namely  = 0.
21 The proofs of the following claims are available from the authors upon request.
22 Formally, the relationship between the characterisation of the leximin by Bossert et al. (2007) and that
by Asheim and Tungodden (2004) is analogous to the relationship between the characterisation of the
utilitarian SWR by Basu and Mitra (2007) and the characterisations of the more restrictive utilitarian SWR
induced by the overtaking criterion (see the discussion in Bossert et al. (2007, p. 580)).
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used – instead of various versions of Hammond equity axiom – to characterise the
leximin criterion proposed by Sakai (2010), which drops transitivity but retains
completeness; and the time-invariant leximin overtaking proposed by Asheim et al.
(2010).23
5. The Intergenerational Difference Principle
In Section 3, we argued that a potential shortcoming of the leximin criterion is its
sensitivity to infinitesimal changes in welfare profiles and explored the implications of
liberal principles together with a continuity requirement that incorporates a concern
for robustness in social judgements. In the context of intergenerational distributive
justice, a further problem of the various extensions of the leximin criterion is their
incompleteness, which makes them unable to produce social judgements in a large
class of pairwise comparisons of welfare profiles.
In this Section, we complete our study of liberal principles of non-interference by
analysing the implications of the Weak Harm Principle	 for intergenerational justice
when social welfare criteria are required to be continuous and to be able to
adjudicate all distributive conflicts. This is by no means a trivial question, for it is
well known that continuity is a problematic requirement for SWOs in economies with
an infinite number of agents and impossibility results often emerge.24
The main axioms incorporating completeness, fairness, efficiency, and liberal non-
interference are the same as in previous Sections. Further, we follow the standard
practice in the literature (Lauwers, 1997) and define continuity based on the sup
metric.
SUP CONTINUITY. For all u 2 X1, if there is a sequence of profiles fvkg1k¼1 in X1 such that
limk!1vk ¼ v 2 X1 with respect to the sup metric d1, and vk<u (u< vk) for all k 2 N, then
u ¤ v (v ¤ u).
Observe that in general Sup continuity is weaker than the standard continuity
axiom but it is equivalent to the latter if the SWR is complete as in Theorem 3
below.25
As in the previous Section, we also impose a technical requirement to deal with
comparisons of infinite-dimensional profiles.
PREFERENCE CONTINUITY. For all u; v 2 X1, if there is a generation ~T  1 such that
ð1uT , T þ 1vÞ< v for each successive generation T  ~T , then u< v.
23 As compared to the standard overtaking criterion, the time invariant version does not rely on a natural
ordering of generations. Thus, it is possible to drop weak preference continuity and replace it with a similar
consistency axiom that does not entail a preference for earlier generations.
24 See the classic paper by Diamond (1965). For more recent contributions see Hara et al. (2008) and the
literature cited therein.
25 It is also weaker than the continuity axiom recently proposed by Asheim et al. (2012, p. 271), although
the two properties are equivalent for complete SWRs.
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Our next result extends the key insights on liberal egalitarianism to the intergen-
erational context: anonymity, weak Pareto, completeness, sup continuity, the Weak
Harm Principle	 and preference continuity characterise the maximin SWO <M on X1
(see Definition 2).26
THEOREM 3. A SWR < on X1 is the maximin SWO <M if and only if it satisfies anonymity,
weak Pareto, completeness, sup continuity, the Weak Harm Principle	 and preference
continuity.
Proof. Since the proof of the (⇒) part of the statement can be easily verified, we
shall only prove its (⇐) part.
(⇐) Let < on X1 be a SWR satisfying the specified set of axioms. To show that < is
the maximin SWO, it suffices to prove that for all u; v 2 X1,
inf
i2N
ui [ inf
i2N
vi ) u  v (3)
and
inf
i2N
ui ¼ inf
i2N
vi ) u v: (4)
Consider (3). Take any u; v 2 X1 such that inf i2N ui [ inf i2N vi . In order to prove
that u  v, we first demonstrate that conx^ < v holds, where:
x^ ¼ inf i2N ui þ inf i2N vi
2
:
To this end, we consider two cases, according to whether supi2N vi\ 1 or
supi2N vi ¼ 1.
Case 1. supi2N vi\ 1.
As a first step, we prove the following claim.
CLAIM 1. There is a generation T ≥ 1 such that for all t ≥ T and for any real number  > 0
such that the combined profile ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þ conÞ is in X1, we have ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þ conÞ< v.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose not. Since < on X1 satisfies completeness, it follows that
for each generation T ≥ 1 there exist a generation t ≥ T and a real number  > 0 such
that ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þ conÞ 2 X1 and v  ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þ conÞ.
Since x^ [ inf i2N vi , it follows that there exists a generation T 	  1 such that
x^ [ vT 	  inffv1; . . .; vT 	g. By the contradicting hypothesis, and since < satisfies
completeness, there exists a generation t	  T 	 and a real number  > 0 such that
26 The properties in Theorem 3 are independent (details are available from the authors upon request). It
is worth noting in passing that the characterisation of the maximin SWO can be obtained without the full force
of completeness, by adopting an axiom similar to minimal completeness. We thank Geir Asheim for this
suggestion.
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ð1x^t	 ; t	 þ 1v þcon Þ 2 X1 and v  ð1x^t	 ; t	 þ 1v þconÞ. For the sake of notational simplic-
ity, let x  ð1x^t	 ; t	 þ 1v þ conÞ. Observe that x^ [ inffv1; . . .; vT 	g  inffv1; . . .; vt	g.
For any u 2 X1, and all T ≥ 1, recall that 1uT ¼ ðu1; . . .; uT Þ is a permutation of the
T-head of u such that the components are ranked in ascending order. Let
~v  ð1vt	 ; t	 þ 1vÞ. By anonymity and transitivity, ~v x. Suppose that 1xt	 
 1vt	 . Then,
there exists a real number a such that 0\ a\ inffinffxt  ~vt jt  t	g; =2g and
xt  ~vt þ a for all t 2 N. But then weak Pareto implies x  ~v yielding a contradiction.
Therefore, suppose that for some 1\ t  t	 we have that ~vt  xt ¼ x^. We proceed
according to the following steps.
Step 1. Let:
q ¼ inff1\t  t	j~vt  x^g:
Then, consider two real numbers d1, d2 [ 0, and two profiles x1; v0 2 X1 formed from
x, ~v as follows: xq is lowered to x1q ¼ xq  d1 ¼ x^  d1 [ ~v1 ¼ inffv1; . . .; vt	g; ~vq is
lowered to v0q ¼ ~vq  d2 where x^ [ ~vq  d2 [ x^  d1; and all other entries of
x and ~v are unchanged. Let ~x1  ð1x1t	 ; t	 þ 1xÞ, ~v0  ð1v0t	 ; t	 þ 1vÞ. By construction, ~x1t [ ~v0t
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ q, whereas by the Weak Harm Principle	, completeness, anonymity, and
transitivity we have ~v0< ~x1.
Step 2. Let:
0\k\ inf inff~x1t  ~v0t jt  qg; inff1 ~v0t jq\t  t	g;

2t	
 
\ (5)
and define ~v1 ¼ ~v0 þ conk. By construction, ~v1 2 X1 and ~v1i  ~v0i þ k for all i 2 N, and
so weak Pareto implies ~v1  ~v0. Since ~v0< ~x1, then transitivity implies that ~v1  ~x1.
Suppose that 1~x1t	 
 1~y1t	 . Then, since inf i2N ~x1i [ inf i2N ~v1i and t	 þ 1~x1 
 t	 þ 1~v1,
there exists a real number a 2 ð0; inf inff~x1t  ~v1t jt  t	g; k=2t	
 Þ such that
~x1i  ~v1i þ a for all i 2 N. Weak Pareto implies ~x1  ~v1 yielding a contradiction.
Otherwise, let ~v1t  ~x1t for some t, with q\ t  t	. Let:
q 0 ¼ inffq\t  t	j~v1t  ~x1t g:
Noting that by (5),   k ¼ 0 [ 0 so that t	 þ 1~x1  t	 þ 1~v1 ¼ con0 
 con0, the above
steps 1 and 2 can be applied to ~x1, ~v1 to derive profiles ~x2; ~v2 2 X1 such that ~x2t [ ~v2t
for all 1 t  q 0, whereas ~v2  ~x2. By weak Pareto, a contradiction can be obtained if
1x
2
t	 
 1v2t	 . Otherwise, let ~x2t  ~v2t for some q 0\ t  t	. And so on. After a finite
number s\ t	 of iterations, two profiles ~xs; ~vs 2 X1 can be derived such that ~vs  ~xs ,
by steps 1 and 2, but 1xst	 
 1vst	 , and so ~xs  ~vs can be obtained by applying weak
Pareto, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
We can now show that conx^< v. To this end, choose a natural number H such that
v þ conh1 2 X1 for all natural numbers h ≥ H: the existence of H is guaranteed by
the assumption supi2N vi\ 1. By Claim 1, there exists T ≥ 1 such that
ð1x^t ;t þ 1v þ conh1Þ<v for all t ≥ T and all h ≥ H. Fix any generation t ≥ T. Then, since
limh!1ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þconh1Þ ¼ ð1x^t ; t þ 1vÞ 2 X1 and ð1x^t ; t þ 1v þ conh1Þ< v for any
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h ≥ H, sup continuity and completeness imply that ð1x^t ; t þ 1vÞ< v. Because the choice
of generation t ≥ T was arbitrary, it follows that ð1x^t ; t þ 1vÞ< v for all t ≥ T, and so
preference continuity implies that conx^ < v, as sought.
Case 2. supi2N vi ¼ 1.
As inf i2N ui [ inf i2N vi , choose a natural number K large enough such that the set
NðK Þ defined below is non-empty:
NðK Þ  i 2 Nj1  1
K
\vi  1; vl\vi  1
K
for some generation l
 
:
Consider profile vK formed from v as follows: vKi ¼ vi  ð1=K Þ, for all i 2 NðK Þ, and
vKi ¼ vi for all i 62 NðK Þ. By construction, vK 2 X1, supi2N vKi  1  ð1=K Þ and
inf i2N ui [ inf i2N vKi ¼ inf i2N vi . By the same argument as in Case 1, it follows that
conx^< vK . Then, for any natural number k ≥ K, consider the sequence vki ¼ vi  ð1=kÞ,
for all i 2 NðK Þ, and vki ¼ vi for all i 62 NðK Þ. Since the above arguments hold for any
natural number k ≥ K, then conx^< vk for all k ≥ K. Further, limk!1ðvkÞ ¼ v and so
conx^<v follows from completeness and sup continuity.
We have established that conx^< v. In order to complete the proof of (3), we note that
by construction, u 
conx^ and inf i2N ui [ x^, and so weak Pareto implies that u conx^. By
transitivity we conclude that u v, as sought.
Next, we show that (4) holds as well. Suppose that inf i2N ui ¼ inf i2N vi . If
inf i2N ui ¼ 1, then the result follows by reflexivity. Hence suppose inf i2N ui\ 1.
Choose a natural number K sufficiently large such that the set
Nðu;K Þ  l 2 Nj1  1
K
[ul  inf
i2N
ui
 
is non-empty. Then, for all natural numbers k ≥ K, consider uk formed from u as follows:
uki ¼ ui þ ð1=kÞ, all i 2 Nðu;K Þ, and uki ¼ ui , all i 62 Nðu;K Þ. By construction, uk 2 X1
and inf i2N uki [ inf i2N vi , and so u
k  v by (3) for all k ≥ K. Therefore since
limk!1uk ¼ u, completeness and sup continuity imply u< v. A similar argument proves
v<u, and thus we obtain u v. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 establishes an interesting possibility result for liberal approaches in
economies with an infinite number of agents. For it proves that there exist fair,
Paretian and continuous SWOs that respect a liberal principle of non-interference.
Indeed, the maximin SWO satisfies even the stronger version of the Weak Harm
Principle (analogous to that presented in Section 2) extended to hold for any
countably infinite welfare profiles.
Further, Theorem 3 provides a novel, and interesting characterisation of the
maximin SWO in the intergenerational context. Lauwers (1997) characterises the
maximin SWO in the infinite context by focusing on weak Pareto, anonymity,27
27 Actually, the characterisation by Lauwers (1997) relies on a strong anonymity axiom that considers all
permutations of the welfare profiles.
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continuity, repetition approximation and either a strong version of Hammond
equity,28 or ordinal level comparability. Theorem 3 provides a completely different
liberal foundation to the maximin SWO, because the Weak Harm Principle	 is logically
and theoretically distinct both from axioms with an egalitarian content, such as
Hammond equity, and from informational invariance conditions.
6. Conclusions
A number of recent contributions have raised serious doubts on the possibility of a fair
and efficient liberal approach to distributive justice that incorporates a fully non-
interfering view. This article shows that possibility results do emerge, in societies with
both a finite and an infinite number of agents, provided the bite of non-interference is
limited in an ethically relevant way. Anonymous and Paretian criteria exist which
incorporate a notion of protection of individuals (or generations) from unjustified
interference, in situations in which they suffer a welfare loss, provided no other agent
(or generation) is affected.
A weaker version of a liberal axiom – the Harm Principle – recently proposed by
Mariotti and Veneziani (2009), together with standard properties, allows us to derive a
set of new characterisations of the maximin and of its lexicographic refinement,
including in the intergenerational context. This is surprising, because the Weak Harm
Principle is meant to capture a liberal and libertarian requirement of non-interference
and it incorporates no obvious egalitarian content. Thus, our results shed new light on
the ethical foundations of the egalitarian approaches stemming from Rawls’s
difference principle, and provide new meaning to the label of liberal egalitarianism
usually attached to Rawls’s theory.
From the viewpoint of liberal approaches emphasising a notion of individual
autonomy, or freedom, however, our results have a rather counterintuitive implication.
For they prove that, in various contexts, liberal non-interfering principles lead straight
to welfare egalitarianism.
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